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1 Introduction
There exists a large literature analyzing the eﬀects of search frictions in
the labor market. In this literature firms are typically modelled in a rather
parsimonious way. In particular agency problems between workers and firms
are ignored. The focus is thus solely on the eﬀects of search frictions on the
flows into and out of employment.
In this paper we dig deeper into the relationship between the worker and
the firm. First, we introduce a moral hazard problem by letting a worker’s
work eﬀort to be unobservable to the firm. Second, we assume that a worker
also has private information regarding her productivity in that particular
job. The firm acts as a principal and chooses a wage contract that maximizes
profits given the information constraints. Our aim is to analyze the interplay
between search frictions in the market place and agency problems created by
private information within the firm.
Search frictions and agency problems interact because of the amount of
"rents" that accrue to the worker. A worker’s private information gives her
an information rent, which is larger the closer wages are linked to the workers’
output. When the firm sets the wage contract, it trades oﬀ incentives for the
worker to provide eﬀort and rent extraction from the worker. However, when
there is search frictions in the labor market, more rents to the worker also
benefits the firm as it speeds up the hiring process. Hence, it is less costly
for a firm to provide workers with incentives when operating in a frictional
market rather than in a frictionless market.
We show that the resulting search equilibrium, which we refer to as gen-
eralized competitive search equilibrium, has a simple form, and is charac-
terized by a modified Hosios Rule that determines the constrained eﬃcient
resource allocation. When the information constraints are tight in a well-
defined sense, the optimal wage contract leaves a relatively large amount of
rents to the employees. As a result, profit will be lower, and fewer resources
are used to create new jobs.
We then analyze the eﬀects of changes in the macroeconomic environ-
ment on the wage contract and the unemployment rate. First we analyze
the eﬀects of negative productivity changes where all firms are hit equally
hard. Such a negative shock tightens the constraints imposed by the workers’
private information, and the worker’s share of the match surplus increases.
Therefore, the unemployment rate becomes more responsive to such shocks
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than in the standard search model. If the recession is caused by changes in
the information structure, or if worker eﬀort is more crucial after a negative
change, the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to negative shocks is
further increased and may be arbitrarily large.
Our model can thus contribute to the debate following Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2004a) who document that fluctuations in the unemployment rate
predicted by the model in response to observed productivity shocks are much
smaller than actual fluctuations in the unemployment rate, as wages in the
model absorb much of the shock. Note also that our analysis indicates that
a counter-cyclical sharing rule, where workers receive a larger share of the
surplus after a negative shock, may be an optimal response to information
problems between employers and employees.
Furthermore, we find that a positive productivity shock or a fall in un-
employment benefits both tend to increase the incentive power of the wage
contract. In both cases the shift increases the average match surplus. As a
result, there are more rents available in the relationship, and therefore also
room for more high-powered incentive contracts. Similarly, an increase in
search frictions also tends to increase the incentive power of the wage con-
tract.
Our private information model builds on the procurement model by Laf-
font and Tirole (1993) and its adoption to a frictionless labor market by Moen
and Rosén (2006). As the emphasis in the present paper is on the interplay
between search frictions and wage contracts its analysis diﬀers radically from
that of Moen and Rosén (2006).
In a related model, Faig and Jerez (2005) analyze a retail market with
search frictions when buyers have private information about their willingness-
to-pay. Although their paper studies private information in a competitive
search environment, their model and emphasis diﬀer from ours. They focus
on welfare analysis and abstract from moral hazard problems. Moreover,
they neither derive the modified Hosios condition, nor analyze the impact of
macroeconomic variables on sharing rules and incentives.
Shimer and Wright (2004) consider a competitive search model where
firms (not workers) have private information about productivity and workers
have private information about eﬀort. They show how private information
may distort trade, thereby increasing unemployment. However, the mecha-
nism in their paper diﬀers from ours. We focus on the division of the match
surplus between workers and firms as an instrument to mitigate the ineﬃ-
ciencies caused by private information, summarized in the modified Hosios
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condition. This is absent in Shimer and Wright, who instead focus on the
direct eﬀect of the ineﬃciencies created by two-sided private information on
unemployment and vacancy rates.
Several recent studies seek to make the search model consistent with
Shimer and Hall’s empirical findings. In Kennan (2004), workers and firms
bargain over wages once they meet. Firms have private information in booms,
but not in recessions, and thus earn information rents in booms. This in-
creases the profits in booms, and thus also unemployment volatility. Nagypál
(2004) and Krause and Lubik (2004) show that on-the-job search in a match-
ing model may amplify the eﬀects of productivity shocks on the unemploy-
ment rate. Menzio (2004) illustrates that firms with private information
may find it optimal to keep wages fixed if hit by high-frequency shocks. In
Rudanko (2005) the eﬀect of risk averse workers and contractual incomplete-
ness on volatility is explored. Reiter (2007) shows that the responsiveness
of the unemployment may be increased if one allow for technological change
that is embodied into the match. Gertler, Sala and Triari (2007) explain wage
rigidity by among other things staggered wage contracts. For an extended
survey of this literature see Mortensen and Nagypál (2006).
Our model is also related to the literature on eﬃciency wage models (e.g.
Weiss, 1980; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Some of these papers examine the
comparative static properties of eﬃciency wage models, (Strand, 1992; Dan-
thine and Donaldson, 1990; Ramey and Watson, 1997; MacLeod, Malcomson
and Gomme, 1994; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1998). In a static model, Ro-
cheteau (2001) introduces shirking in a search model and shows that the
non-shirking constraint forms a lower bound on wages.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. The
generalized competitive search equilibrium is defined in section 3 and char-
acterized in section 4. In section 5 we apply the model and analyze the eﬀects
of macroeconomic variables on the wage contract and the unemployment rate.
Section 6 oﬀers final comments.
2 The model
The matching of unemployed workers and vacancies is modelled using the
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework (Diamond, 1982; Mortensen, 1986;
Pissarides, 1985) with competitive wage setting. The economy consists of a
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continuum of ex ante identical workers and firms. All agents are risk neutral
and have the same discount factor r. The measure of workers is normalized
to one. Workers leave the market at an exogenous rate s and new workers
enter the market as unemployed at the same rate. Abandoned firms have no
value.
We study a segment of the labor market where workers have the same
observable characteristics.1 Still there is ex post heterogeneity. As in Jo-
vanovic (1979) and many subsequent papers (See Pissarides 2000, ch. 6
for an overview) we assume stochastic job matching, meaning that the pro-
ductivity of a given worker-firm pair is match-specific. In addition, output
depends on worker eﬀort. The output y of a worker-firm pair is
y(ε, e) = y + ε+ γe, (1)
where y is a constant, ε the match-specific term (or stochastic matching
term), and e worker eﬀort. The parameter γ is a measure of the relative
importance of worker eﬀort. As is common in the stochastic matching lit-
erature, we assume ε is i.i.d across all worker-firm matches. (In footnote 5
we argue that our results also hold when allowing for some correlation of the
stochastic match component.) For any given match, ε is constant over time
and continuously distributed on an interval [ε, ε] with cumulative distribution
function H, density function h, and with increasing hazard rate.
Output is observable to both the worker and the firm. However, as in most
models of optimal wage contracts the worker (the agent) has an information
advantage over the firm (the principal) — we assume that only the worker can
decompose output y into eﬀort e and the stochastic matching term ε.
As output is contractible, wage contracts are contingent on y. The utility
flow of a worker is given by
ω = w − ψ(e), (2)
where w denotes the wage (we suppress the functional dependence on y) and
ψ(e) the cost of eﬀort. The function ψ(e) is increasing, and its derivative
ψ0(e) is increasing and convex in e. When a worker and a firm meet, the
worker learns ε and then decides whether to accept or reject the contract.
As wages depend on y, a worker chooses her eﬀort level such that dwdy = ψ
0(e).
1Workers with diﬀerent observable (and contractible) characteristics would be oﬀered
diﬀerent wage contracts. Furthermore, in competitive search equilibrium they search in
separated search markets and hence do not create search externalities towards each other.
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For any given wage contract, there exists a cut-oﬀ value εc ≥ ε such that
a worker accepts a job if and only if ε ≥ εc. If she rejects the contract she
starts searching again, and the job remains vacant.
We know from the revelation principle that any output-dependent con-
tract can be represented as a contract of the form φ = (w(ε), e(ε), εc), which
satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation con-
straint of the worker, to be defined below. In what follows we define wage
contracts on this form. We do not consider tenure-dependent contracts. This
is without loss of generality, as we show later that the optimal contract is
tenure-independent.
Let u denote the unemployment rate and v the vacancy rate in the econ-
omy. Firms are free to open vacancies at no cost, but maintaining a vacancy
entails a flow cost c. The number of matches is determined by a concave,
constant return to scale matching function x(u, v). Let p denote the match-
ing rate of workers and q the matching rate of firms. Since the matching
function has constant return to scale, we can write q = q(p), with q0(p) < 0.2
Before we continue we want to make two comments regarding the set-up,
both related to the match-specific term ε. The first comment regards the
exact timing of when a worker learns the match specific productivity term
ε. We assume that a worker learns ε before the contract is signed. This
sequence rules out up-front payments from the worker to the firm before the
worker learns ε. If up-front payments are not admitted, it is suﬃcient that
the worker learns ε after exerting eﬀort and observing y.
The second comment regards our assumption that the match-specific pro-
ductivity term is unobservable to the firm. An alternative interpretation is
that firms, although able to observe ε, are unwilling or unable to diﬀerentiate
output-contingent wage contracts between workers with the same observable
characteristics but with diﬀerent stochastic matching terms. Diﬀerent wage
contracts would here mean oﬀering less attractive contracts to workers with
a high stochastic match term. Evidence that workers with diﬀerent produc-
tivity work under the same bonus scheme is given in e.g., Lazear (2000).
Asset value equations
The asset value equations define the parties’ payoﬀs for a given wage con-
tract φ = (w(ε), e(ε), εc). Let U denote the expected discounted utility of
2The probability rates p and q can be written as p = x(u, v)/u = x(1, θ) = ep(θ) and
q = x(u, v)/v = x(1/θ, 1) = q˜(θ). The matching technology can thus be summarized by a
function q = q˜(θ) = q˜(ep−1(p)) = q(p).
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an unemployed worker and fW (ε) the expected discounted utility of an em-
ployed worker with a match-specific productivity term ε, hereafter somewhat
imprecisely referred to as her type. Then fW (ε) is defined as
(r + s)fW (ε) = w(ε)− ψ(e(ε)).
The expected discounted value of a worker being matched is
W =
Z ε
εc
fW (ε)dH +H(εc)U.
The expected discounted utility of an unemployed worker is given by
(r + s)U = z + p(W − U),
where z is the utility flow when unemployed.
Let V denote the expected discounted value of a firm with a vacancy andeJ(ε) the expected discounted value of a filled job with a worker of type ε,
where eJ(ε) is defined as
(r + s) eJ(ε) = y(e(ε), ε)− w(ε).
The expected value of a firm being matched is
J =
Z ε
εc
eJ(ε)dH +H(εc)V
=
Z ε
εc
y(e(ε), ε)− w(ε)
r + s
dH +H(εc)V. (3)
The value of a vacancy can thus be written as
rV = −c+ q(J − V ).
For our subsequent analysis it is convenient to use the concept of worker
rents associated with a match. The rents from a match reflect the workers’
expected "capital gain" of being matched to a vacancy. Note that the ex-
pected rent associated with a match may be lower than the expected rent
associated with employment, because not all matches need to end up in em-
ployment. The expected worker rents of a match can be expressed as
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R ≡ W − U
=
Z ε
εc
[
w(ε)− ψ(e(ε))
r + s
− U ]dH. (4)
Using the definition of worker rents, the expected income of an unemployed
worker takes a particularly simple form
(r + s)U = z + pR. (5)
That is, the flow value of an unemployed worker is equal to the utility flow
when unemployed plus the expected gain from search, which is equal to the
matching rate times the expected rent associated with a match. The total
expected surplus of a match is S ≡ J − V + R, or (using equations (3) and
(4))
(r + s)S =
Z ε
εc
[y(e(ε), ε)− ψ(e(ε))− (r + s)U − (r + s)V ]dH. (6)
3 Generalized competitive search equilibrium
Our equilibrium concept is the competitive search equilibrium (Moen 1997),
which combines competitive price determination and search frictions. One of
its core element is the unique relationship between the attractiveness of the
oﬀered wage contract and the expected rate at which the vacancy is filled.
This relationship can be derived in several alternative settings. Moen (1997)
assumes that a market maker creates submarkets, and shows that the same
equilibrium can be obtained if firms advertise wages. This interpretation is
further developed inMortensen andWright (2002). Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999, section 4.1) interpret the market maker as a ”middle man” (like a job
center) that sets the wage. In Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a and 1999b)
the labor market is divided into regional or industrial submarkets oﬀering
potentially diﬀerent wages. In the present paper we choose the interpretation
that firms advertise wage contracts.
To characterize the unique relationship between the wage contract and
the arrival rate of workers, let U∗ denote the equilibrium utility of a searching
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worker. The queue length of workers adjusts so that any worker who applies
to any given firm must get an expected utility equal to U∗. That is,
z + pR = (r + s)U∗, (7)
which defines a unique, decreasing relationship betweenR, the expected rents
associated with a match, and the probability rate p at which the worker is
matched. Since q = q(p), there is a unique relationship between the arrival
rate of applicants to a firm and the value of rents that this firm oﬀers; q =
q(p(R)).
Let Φ denote the set of wage contracts φ = (w(ε), e(ε), εc) and let ΦD de-
note the set of feasible contract. With private information, a feasible contract
has to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation
constraint of the worker, to be specified below.
From the worker’s perspective, the attractiveness of a wage contract is
given by the expected value of being matched; W = U + R. For a given
U , the attractiveness of a wage contract can therefore be summarized by R.
Let ΦD(R) ∈ ΦD denote the subset of feasible contracts that give the worker
an expected rent R.
A firm chooses the wage contract φ that maximizes V , taking U as given.
The value of a vacancy can thus be expressed as
rV = max
R
max
φ∈ΦD(R)
−c+ q(p(R))[J(φ)− V ]. (8)
The solution procedure for the optimal contract can be decomposed into two
steps:
1. For a given R, solve for the contract φ ∈ ΦD(R) that maximizes J , the
value of a match to the firm. Denote this optimal value by JD(R).
2. Maximize the value of a vacancy V = −c + q(p(R))(JD(R)− V ) with
respect to R, where p(R) is defined by (7).
The resulting vacancy value can be written as V max(U). Free entry then
assures that
V max(U) = 0. (9)
9
Definition. The generalized competitive search equilibrium (GCS-equilibrium)
is a vector (U∗, R∗, p∗, φ∗) that solves the maximization problems 1 and 2
above and satisfies (9).
As a benchmark, we first solve for the equilibrium outcome in the special
case where ε and e are observable and contractible. The contract still has
to satisfy the worker’s participation constraint. That is, fW (ε) ≥ U for all
ε ≥ εc. The problem of maximizing J for a given expected rent R (step 1)
can be formulated as
max
w(ε),e(ε),εc
(r + s)J = max
w(ε),e(ε),εc
Z ε
εc
[y + ε+ γe(ε)− w(ε)− (r + s)V ]dH
s.t.
(r + s)R =
Z ε
εc
[w(ε)− ψ(e(ε))− (r + s)U ]dH (10)
fW (ε) ≥ U ∀ε ≥ εc. (11)
Suppose the participation constraint (11) does not bind for any ε ≥ εc. Sub-
stituting the rent constraint (10) into the maximand simplifies the problem
to
max
e(ε),εc
Z ε
εc
[y + ε+ γe(ε)− ψ(e(ε))− (r + s)U − (r + s)V ]dH − (r + s)R,
with first order conditions
ψ0(e(ε)) = γ for all ε, (12)
y + εc + γe(εc)− ψ(e(εc)) = (r + s)U + (r + s)V. (13)
The first equation determines the eﬃcient eﬀort level. The second equation
defines the eﬃcient cut-oﬀ level, which equalizes the worker’s net productivity
with the outside options. Note that the solution is independent of R. Since
workers are risk neutral, the participation constraint is easy to satisfy. For
instance, the firm may set a constant wage, independent of worker type for
all ε ≥ εc, ensuring that the participation constraint never binds.
Consider now step 2 and let SF denote the full information match surplus.
The firm maximizes the value of a vacancy. As JF − V = SF −R, the firm
solves
10
max
R
−c+ q(p(R))(SF −R), (14)
where p(R) is defined by (7). In Appendix 1, we show that the optimal choice
of R satisfies the Hosios condition (Hosios, 1990)
RF
SF −RF =
η
1− η , (15)
where η denotes the absolute value of the elasticity of q with respect to
θ = v/u. We refer to the equilibrium as the GCS -equilibrium with full
information and denote it by (UF , RF , pF , φF ).
4 Characterizing GCS-equilibrium
When e and ε are private information, we have to specify the relevant incen-
tive compatibility constraint, which ensures that a worker has an incentive
to truthfully reveal her type. In Appendix 2, we show that this incentive
compatibility constraint can be expressed as
ω0(ε) = ψ0(e(ε))/γ, (16)
where ω is the utility flow of the worker as defined by equation (2). If a
worker’s type increases by one unit, she can reduce her eﬀort by 1/γ units
and still obtain the same output, thereby increasing her utility by ψ0(e(ε))/γ
units. Incentive compatibility requires that the worker obtains the same gain
by reporting her type truthfully.
Using equation (16) the rent to a worker of type ε, eR(ε), can be written
as
(r + s) eR(ε) = Z ε
εc
ψ0(e(ε))
γ
dε+ (r + s) eR(εc). (17)
The participation constraint requires that ω(εc) = (r+ s)U for εc > ε, henceeR(εc) = 0 for εc > ε. Note that contracts that prescribe more eﬀort from
low-type workers must give larger rents to high types to keep the incentive
compatibility constraint satisfied.
A first question that arises is whether the GCS-equilibrium with full in-
formation (UF , RF , pF , φF ) is still feasible.
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Lemma 1 a) For εFc > ε the GCS-equilibrium with full information is not
feasible when ε and e are private information to the worker.
b) For εFc = ε the GCS-equilibrium with full information is feasible with
private information if and only if RF > R, where
R =
Z ε
ε
ε− ε
r + s
dH(ε).
Proof. a) Suppose the full information equilibrium is feasible. Denote the
full information output level by yF . The participation constraint (11) and
equation (13) imply that yF (εc) = w(εc) (since V = 0 in equilibrium). From
equations (17), (12) and (1) it follows that (r + s) eR0(ε) = 1 = dy/dε (full
incentives). As a result, yF (ε) = w(ε) for all ε ≥ εc, and thus profits are zero.
Hence, no firm enters the market, which is inconsistent with equilibrium.
b) For εc = ε the participation constraint allows that (r + s)U < yF (ε)
and hence that w(εc) < yF (εc). Since the first-best eﬀort level implies that
ψ0(e(ε)) = γ, the incentive compatibility constraint requires that eR(ε) ≥ ε−εr+s .
To implement the full information equilibrium with private information, we
must thus have that RF ≥ R. If RF > R, the full information equilibrium
can be implemented by setting eR(ε) = RF −R.
In what follows we consider the case where RF < R. We derive the
equilibrium by following the two-step procedure laid out above.
Step 1: Optimal wage contracts given R The firm chooses the contract
that maximizes J given R. Clearly, this is equivalent to the problem of
maximizing S = J−V +R given R. We maximize the match surplus S rather
than J , as this oﬀers a more interesting interpretation of the Lagrangian
parameter. Equations (1) and (6) imply that the firm’s problem is
max
w(ε),e(ε),εc
Z ε
εc
[y + ε+ γe(ε)− ψ(e(ε))− (r + s)U − (r + s)V ]dH,
s.t.
ω0(ε) = ψ0(e(ε))/γ,
ω(εc) = (r + s)U,
(r + s)R =
Z ε
εc
[ω(ε)− (r + s)U ]dH, (18)
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where we have used that the rent constraint always binds. This is an optimal
control problem with e as the control variable and ω(ε) as the state variable.
Denote the Lagrangian parameter associated with the rent constraint (18)
by α and the solutions to S by SM(R;U).
Proposition 1 The optimal contract φM(R;U) is defined by
a) The first order condition for the eﬀort level:
γ − ψ0(e(ε)) = α1−H(ε)
h(ε)
ψ00(e(ε))/γ (19)
b) The optimal cut-oﬀ level, given by either εc = ε or
[y+εc+γe(εc)−ψ(e(εc))−(r+s)U−(r+s)V ]h(εc) = α(1−H(εc))
ψ0(e(εc))
γ
(20)
c) The rent-constraint defined by equation (18).
Proof. See Appendix 3.
In order to understand the conditions, recall that α denotes the shadow
flow value of worker rents for the match surplus SM(R;U). More precisely,
(r + s)SMR = α,
where the subscript R denotes the derivative with respect to R.3
The two first-order conditions generalize optimal contracts with private
information (as in e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993) for a setting with search
frictions. Without frictions the shadow value of rents α would be equal to
1. For α = 0, the first-order conditions coincide with those of the full-
information case. As shown above, this is only feasible when RF ≥ R.
Consider the optimal eﬀort equation (19) and suppose the eﬀort level
of a type εˆ worker increases by one unit. The left-hand side of equation
(19) captures the resulting eﬃciency gain γ − ψ0(e(εˆ)). The right-hand side
captures the costs associated with an increase in eﬀort. A one unit increase
in eﬀort of a type εˆ worker increases the rents of all workers above εˆ by
ψ00(e(εˆ))/γ units (from equation 17) and the shadow value of this rent is α.
The likelihood of obtaining a worker of type εˆ is reflected in h(εˆ), while the
3Given that h has an increasing hazard rate ((1 − H(ε))/h(ε) decreasing in ε) and
ψ000(e) ≥ 0 the equation (19) implies that e(ε) is increasing in ε.
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measure of workers with higher match-specific productivity is 1−H(εˆ). This
explains the factor (1−H(εˆ))/h(εˆ).
The left-hand side of the cut-oﬀ equation (20) shows the net productivity
loss of increasing εc. The right-hand side represents the gain in terms of
reduced rents, which have a shadow flow value α. In Appendix 4, we show
that the cut-oﬀ level is unique for a given α.
Let (a, b) denote a linear contract of the form w = a + by. It is well
known that the optimal non-linear contract can be represented by a menu
(a(ε), b(ε)) of linear contracts.4 For any b, the worker chooses the eﬀort level
such that ψ0(e) = bγ. Inserting this condition into equation (19), we obtain
b(ε) = 1− α1−H(ε)
h(ε)
ψ00(e)
γ2
. (21)
We refer to b(ε) as the incentive power of the optimal contract.
Proposition 2 SM and φM have the following properties:
a) The eﬀort level e(ε) is strictly increasing in R for all ε, and the cut-oﬀ
level εc is decreasing in R.
b)The match surplus SM(R;U) is increasing and concave in R.
c)If all types are hired (εc = ε), then
i) a shift in U shifts a(ε) but leaves b(ε) unchanged for all ε.
ii) a shift in U does not influence the marginal value of rents, i.e.,
SMRU = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
First consider result a). When the principal has more rents to dole out,
she can aﬀord to give stronger incentives to all workers. Furthermore, as the
expected rent is decreasing in the cut-oﬀ level, a higher R also implies that
the principal can aﬀord to hire workers of a lower types, by reducing εc. The
Proposition states that the principal does both.
The first part of b), that the match surplus, SM , increases in R, follows
directly from the fact that the rent constraint bind. The second part of b),
that SM is concave in R, follows from the convexity of the maximization
problem, i.e. that the marginal return from higher eﬀort or a lower cut-oﬀ
level is decreasing.
4See, e.g., Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993.
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Result c) states that if all workers are hired, the workers’ outside option
U does neither influence the incentive power of the contract nor the shadow
value of rents. Intuitively, for a given cut-oﬀ, a change in U (for a given R)
only implies that more income is transferred to the worker, and eﬀort level
stays constant for all types. This property of the optimal contract will be
used extensively below.5
Above we have derived the optimal static (tenure independent) contract.
Lemma 2 The optimal dynamic contract repeats the static contract, pro-
vided that the firm can commit not to renegotiate the contract.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Providing incentives is costly for firms, as it yields information rents to
the inframarginal workers. Deferred compensation or other time dependent
wage contracts do not reduce this information rent, as they do not reduce
the rent high types can obtain by pretending to be low types. Furthermore,
deferred compensation does not influence the participation constraint at the
hiring stage. It may loosen the participation constraint for tenured workers,
but this has no value to the firm as the worker’s outside option is time
independent.
Step 2: Optimal sharing rules A firm maximizes V (R) defined by
rV (R) = −c+ q(p(R))(JM(R;U)− V )
= −c+ q(p(R))(SM(R;U)−R), (22)
where p(R) is defined by equation (7). This problem is similar to the max-
imization problem under full information, defined by equation (14). The
only diﬀerence is that the match surplus is now increasing in R, so that
5 If the match productivities ε where correlated between firms, a worker’s outside option
would increase with ε. However, U 0(ε) < 1/(r + s) would still hold and U 0(ε) would be
smaller when the correlation is weaker. The incentive compatibility constraint would be
unaltered. Furthermore, the participation constraint would still only bind for the lowest
type provided that the correlation is not too high. Hence, our main argument would still
hold. However, the rents associated with a given contract and thus also R would be lower.
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∂JM (R;U)
∂R = S
M
R − 1 > −1. In Appendix 7, we show that the first order
condition for the step 2 maximization problem satisfies
(1− SMR )
R
SM −R =
η
1− η , (23)
where η denotes as before the absolute value of the elasticity of q with respect
to θ = v/u. We refer to this equation as the modified Hosios condition. We
denote this generalized competitive search equilibrium by (U∗, R∗, p∗, φ∗).
Proposition 3 The generalized competitive search equilibrium satisfies the
modified Hosios condition.
The modified Hosios condition states that the workers’s share of the match
surplus increases with the marginal value of worker rents, SMR . Thus, a
smaller fraction of the match surplus is allocated to job creation. When SMR =
0, equation (23) is identical to the Hosios condition with full information
given by equation (15). With full information, a wage increase is purely
redistributional. It reduces the value of a match for the firm by exactly the
same amount as it increases its value to the worker. With private information
this no longer holds. A one unit increase in R increases the match surplus
SM by SMR units, thereby reducing the firm’s wage cost by 1− SMR units.
The competitive search equilibrium with full information maximizes the
asset value of unemployed workers given that firms break even (Acemoglu
and Shimer, 1999b). This property also holds for the GCS-equilibrium:
Lemma 3 The generalized competitive search equilibrium maximizes U given
the free entry constraint V = 0 and the relevant information constraints.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary. In this case there exists a wage contract φ˜
such that U(φ˜) = U˜ > U∗ and V = 0. By definition a firm oﬀering φ˜ breaks
even at U = U˜ . Thus, the firm makes a strictly positive profit if it advertises
this contract when U = U∗ < U˜ (recall that V only depends on U). But
then φ∗ cannot be a profit-maximizing wage contract, a contradiction.
It is well known that the competitive search equilibrium may not be
unique, as our assumption regarding the matching function imposes few re-
strictions on the elasticity η(θ). (If there are more than one equilibrium, they
all give rise to the same value of U and are thus equivalent from a welfare
point of view). When doing comparative static’s it is convenient that the
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equilibrium is unique, and we therefore assume that the matching function
is Cobb-Douglas, x(u, v) = Auβv1−β. It follows that η = β, and the modified
Hosios condition is
(1− SMR )
R
SM −R =
β
1− β . (24)
Lemma 4 For x(u, v) = Auβv1−β, the GCS-equilibrium uniquely determines
U∗, R∗ and p∗.
Proof. The uniqueness of U∗ is ensured by Lemma 3. We will show that
(24) uniquely defines R. The uniqueness of p∗ is then ensured by equation
(7). For a given U = U∗ we know from Proposition 2b that (1 − SMR ) is
increasing in R. Since SMR < 1, S
M − R is also decreasing in R. But then
the left-hand side of (24) is strictly increasing in R so that (24) has a unique
solution.
5 Applications
In this section we address the eﬀects of aggregate shocks on sharing rules
(wages), incentives, and unemployment. Instead of specifying a fully dy-
namic model, we analyze how parameter shifts change the wage contract and
the unemployment rate. Both Shimer (2005) and Mortensen and Nagypal
(2006) argue that the analysis of productivity shocks can be carried out with-
out explicitly modelling the dynamics. An adequate approximation is to do
comparative statics with respect to the productivity variable. Furthermore,
as our contribution is on the conceptual side rather than on the quantitative
side and we are able to get clear-cut analytical results we have decided not
to calibrate the model and do numerical simulations. We first assume that
all worker types are hired, i.e. εc = ε. We return to the case with an interior
cut-oﬀ level in section 5.3.6
In general, a shift in parameters changes the incentive power b(ε) of the
optimal contract even for given values of R and U .... However, some shifts
do not, and we refer to these as information-neutral shifts. Such shifts only
influence the incentive power of the wage contract through their eﬀects on R
and U . Information-neutral shifts are
6In Appendix 8 we show that εc = ε and simultaneously RF < R is indeed possible.
17
• Changes in general (type- and eﬀort-independent) productivity y. This
may be interpreted as changes in input prices (e.g. oil prices).
• Changes in the value of unemployment benefits /value of leisure z.
• Changes in the search cost c and the matching function parameter A.
It follows directly from the first order condition for optimal incentive
power (equation 21) that these shifts do not influence b(ε).. By contrast,
shifts in the distribution of ε and the importance of unobservable eﬀort, γ,
influences the optimal b(ε) directly.
As we will see, information-neutral shifts in productivity y with an ex-
ogenous cut-oﬀ lead at most to rent rigidity. As shown in Brugerman and
Moscarini (2007), this is not suﬃcient to fully explain the Shimer paradox.
However, information changing shifts or information neutral shifts with an
endogenous cut-oﬀ may cause output and worker rents to move in diﬀerent
directions, thereby violating assumption 1a) in Brugerman and Moscarini.
We show that in this case there are no bounds on how large the eﬀects may
be.
5.1 Information-neutral shifts
The eﬀect of information-neutral shifts only depends on their eﬀect on the
equilibrium match surplus S∗ = SM(R∗, U∗). Let S∗R ≡ SMR (R∗, U∗) and let
x denote (a vector of) information-neutral parameters in the model.
Lemma 5 An information-neutral shift moves S∗,R∗ and J∗ in the same
direction, i.e., dS∗, dR∗ and dJ∗all have the same sign.
Proof. See Appendix 9.
Proposition 4 Suppose a shift in an information-neutral parameter x in-
creases S∗. Provided that εc = ε, such a shift
a) reduces the worker’s share of the match surplus,
b) increases the incentive power b(ε) of the wage contract and hence also
eﬀort for all ε.
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Proof. From Lemma 5 we know that R∗ increases, and hence that SR
decreases. The worker’s share of the surplus is (from equation, 24)
R∗
S∗ −R∗ =
β
1− β
1
1− SR
,
which thus decreases in S∗. Part a) of the proposition thus follows. From
Proposition 2a we know that an increase in R increases e(ε) for all ε and
thereby also increases the incentive power b(ε). This proves part b).
An information-neutral change that increases the match surplus increases
the worker’s rents for a given sharing rule. Hence, the marginal value of
worker rents decreases, and in response the firm reduces the share of the
surplus allocated to the worker.
Shifts in y. A shift in y has two eﬀects on S∗. On the one hand,
it increases the value of a match, for a given U . On the other hand, it
increases the outside option U . However, since there is a time delay before an
unemployed worker finds a job, the former eﬀect dominates, and S∗ increases.
(See Appendix 10 for a formal proof.)
Thus, from Proposition 4 we know that a drop in y increases the worker’s
share of the surplus. This is an interesting observation, and is relevant for
the discussion about rigid wages following the findings in Shimer (2005). As
discussed in the introduction, Shimer documents empirical regularities of the
business cycle that the standard matching model of the labor market hardly
can account for. With private information, the workers’ share of the surplus
is counter-cyclical. After a negative shock to y, the match surplus falls.
Hence, for a given sharing rule, the shadow value of worker rents increases.
As a result, firms find it optimal to increase the worker’s share of the surplus.
Thus, wages are more rigid, and the unemployment rate more volatile than
in the standard model without private information. This result is related to
Hall (2005). He argues that due to social norms, the worker’s share of the
match surplus is counter-cyclical.7 Our model generates a counter-cyclical
sharing rule as an optimal response to changes in aggregate variables in the
presence of private information.
As a fall in y reduces S∗, we have from Proposition 4 that the incentive
power of the equilibrium wage contracts measured by b(ε) falls for all ε.
7Hall (2004b) also shows that wage stickiness may be the result of alternative specifi-
cations of the bargaining procedure or of self-selection among workers.
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Loosely interpreted, the model thus predict that there should be less variable
pay when aggregate productivity is low.
Shifts in unemployment benefits. An increase in z, unemployment
benefits or value of leisure decreases S∗ (see Appendix 10). Intuitively higher
unemployment benefits increase the workers’ outside options, thus reducing
the available match surplus.
An increase in unemployment benefits thus has a direct and an indirect
eﬀect on the unemployment rate. The direct or standard eﬀect is that it
lowers the match surplus, leading to less entry for a given sharing rule. Our
new, indirect eﬀect from Proposition 4 is that the share of the match surplus
allocated to the worker increases, which further increases the unemployment
rate.
Proposition 4 also shows that there is a link between unemployment ben-
efits and the optimal wage contract. As z increases and S∗ falls, there are
less rents to the workers, and the incentive power of the wage contract falls.
Thus, our model predicts that higher unemployment benefits are associated
with less incentive pay and lower eﬀort provision.
Shifts in the search cost c and the matching technology parame-
ter A. An increase in search cost c increases S∗ (see Appendix 10). Again
the change has a direct and an indirect eﬀect on the unemployment rate, but
now they go in opposite directions. The direct (standard) eﬀect of an increase
in c is higher unemployment. For a given sharing rule, fewer firms enter the
market and the unemployment rate increases. The indirect, countervailing
eﬀect is that the workers’ share of the surplus falls (from Proposition 4). As
a result, private information tends to dampen the eﬀects of higher search
costs on the unemployment rate.
Since the rents that are allocated to worker’s in equilibrium increase, a
higher value of c implies that the wage contracts become more incentive-
powered. If search costs are suﬃciently large, it follows that RF > R, and
all workers are given first-best incentives.
An increase in A has the same eﬀect as a fall in c. As match surplus
increases, the worker’s share of the surplus decreases, and the incentive power
of the contract increases for all ε.
When search frictions are high it is more important for firms to speed
up the hiring process by oﬀering workers more rents. Thus, the cost of
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providing incentives in terms of higher worker rents falls, and firms increase
the incentive power of the contract.
5.2 Information-changing shifts
In this subsection we analyze the eﬀects of shifts that influence the optimal
contract directly (for given values of U and R).
Consider first a shift in the distribution of ε. To this end, write the match-
specific productivity term as ε = kμ, where μ is symmetrically distributed
on [−1, 1] and and k is a scalar. Let eH(μ) denote the cumulative distribution
function of μ. Let k denote the value of k such that R∗ = R (k is thus the
highest possible k for which the full-information equilibrium is feasible). We
study the eﬀects of an increase in k for k ≥ k. On the one hand, an increase
in k increases the amount of private information workers possess. For a
given R, the incentive power of the wage contract thus decreases, which tend
to increase the marginal value of eﬀort and thus SMR . On the other hand,
an increase in k implies that more rents are needed to increase workers’
incentives, which tends to reduce the value of SMR . It turns out that if the
private information problems are moderate (k relatively close to k), the first
eﬀect dominates, and an increase in k increases SMR . If private information
problems are more severe, an increase in k may reduce SMR . Define the
"average" incentive power as8
b =
Z ε
ε
b(ε)/(ε− ε)dε.
We show in Appendix 11 that a suﬃcient condition for ensuring that an
increase in k increases SMR is that b ≥ 1/2. Note that if R is close to R, then
b is close to 1 for all ε.
As long as εc = ε, an increase in k reduces expected output: for a given
R, an increase in k implies that the optimal contract cuts back on worker
eﬀort, and output falls. The firm may compensate by increasing R, but due
8Note that b is generally not equal to the expected value of b, but is if ε is uniformly
distributed.
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to the envelope theorem this has only a second order eﬀect on U∗. Hence,
an increase in k decreases U∗, and can thus be considered as a recession.
We want to illustrate with an example that the eﬀects of changes in the
information structure may lead to large changes in the unemployment rate
relative to the change in output per worker (net of eﬀort costs). To this end,
suppose k = k initially, such that the full information outcome is achievable
but with no slack. Let ey denote expected output net of eﬀort cost and recall
that u denotes the unemployment rate.
Proposition 5 Consider an increase in k, and suppose k = k initially. Let
u(k) and ey(k) denote equilibrium values of u and ey. Then,
lim
k→k+
du(k)
dey(k) =∞.
Proof. See Appendix 12.
Let us next consider the eﬀects of shifts in the importance of unobservable
eﬀort γ.
Lemma 6 Given that εc = ε, the marginal value of rents SMR (R,U) is in-
creasing in γ provided that ψ00/(ψ0)2 is non-increasing in e.9
Proof. See Appendix 13.
An increase in γ tends to increase output, and is in that sense a positive
shock. However, a shock may influence both y and γ. For instance, if a fall
in y is caused by an increase in input prices (e.g. oil prices) and eﬀort and
energy are substitutes, a fall in y goes hand in hand with an increase in γ.
Furthermore, the elasticity of the unemployment rate to average productivity
may be arbitrarily high if the fall in y and increase in γ implies that average
productivity barely falls while the change in γ is substantial.
More generally, information-changing shifts, if correlated with the busi-
ness cycle, may increase the volatility of the unemployment rate. If workers
have more private information during a downturn, or if unobservable eﬀort
is more important during a downturn, this will further increase the negative
eﬀect on the unemployment rate.
9This restriction is rather mild, and is satisfied for most convex functions. For instance,
any polynomial of the form ψ(e) = en (n > 1) satisfies this condition, as well as the
exponential function exp e.
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Note also that for information-changing shifts the conditions in Bruger-
man and Moscarini (2007) are not satisfied. For instance, the eﬀect of an
increase in k, for k close to k, is a decrease in average productivity together
with an increase in the expected rent. Hence, their assumption 1a is vio-
lated. The same may be true if a reduction in y goes hand in hand with an
increase in γ. This is also true for shifts in the cut-oﬀ level discussed in the
next subsection.
5.2.1 Eﬀects through the cut-oﬀ level
So far we have assumed that all types are hired. In this subsection we briefly
discuss the eﬀects of the same shifts when εc > ε. To facilitate reading we
repeat the first-order condition for optimal cut-oﬀ level εc.
y + εc + γe(εc)− ψ(e(εc))− (r + s)U = α
(1−H(εc))
h(εc)
b(εc). (25)
(where we have used that ψ0(e(εc)) = γb(εc)). The left-hand side is the
match surplus associated with the marginal worker. It reflects the cost of
increasing εc and thereby not realizing matches with positive match surplus.
The right-hand side reflects the gain of increasing εc in terms of lower rents
for higher types that are hired.
Proposition 6 For information-neutral productivity shifts, a fall in y or a
rise in z increases the cut-oﬀ level εc. A fall in A or increase in c decreases
the cut-oﬀ level.
Proof. See Appendix 14.
A fall in y implies that the left-hand side of equation (25) falls (since
y falls more than (r + s)U). This tends to increase the cut-oﬀ level εc.
Furthermore, we know that an increase in α also increases εc (Appendix 5).
A similar argument holds for shifts in z, A and c.
Thus, in all cases the eﬀects through the cut-oﬀ level seems to exacerbate
our previous findings regarding the responsiveness of the unemployment rate
to shocks. In particular, a negative shift in y increases the cut-oﬀ level, and
thereby leads to a further increase in the unemployment rate. However, there
is a caveat here: As εc shifts up after a fall in y, this tends to dampen the
increase in SMR , and SMR may even fall. However, this typically happens when
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the increase in εc (and thus its adverse eﬀect on the unemployment rate) is
large.
Lemma 7 a) An increase in k reduces the proportion of accepted matches
provided that b(εc) ≥ 1/2 and εc is close to ε.
b) Consider an increase in γ combined with a reduction in y such that U∗
is unchanged. This reduces the proportion of accepted matches provided that
ψ00/(ψ0)2 is non-increasing in e.
Proof. See Appendix 15.
The qualifier under point b) is needed because an increase in γ, in addition
to changing the information structure, also increases average productivity,
and the latter eﬀect tends to reduce εc.
6 Final comments
In this paper we define and characterize what we refer to as the generalized
competitive search equilibrium, in which workers have private information
regarding their eﬀort and "type". In our model, the firms face a trade-oﬀ
between extracting rents from workers and providing incentives to exert ef-
fort. Search frictions imply that the cost of leaving rents to the worker is
lower than in the standard frictionless model, as worker rents save on search
costs for the firms. We show that the resulting equilibrium satisfies what we
refer to as the modified Hosios condition. We also analyze the equilibrium
eﬀects of changes in macroeconomic variables. Private information may in-
crease the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to productivity changes.
Furthermore, the incentive power of the wage contracts is positively related
to high productivity, low unemployment benefits and high search frictions.
We want to point out that our definition of the generalized competitive
search equilibrium is flexible, and can easily accommodate other forms of in-
centive problems. In a working paper version of this paper (Moen and Rosén
2006) we analyze both a model with shirking as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
and a model with non-pecuniary aspects of employment. For instance, in the
shirking model, workers are identical, but both worker eﬀort and output are
private information to the worker. Eﬀort is either 0 or 1, and the eﬀort cost
is ψ. Let g denote the probability rate that a shirking worker is detected, in
which case she is fired. The non-shirking condition is then given by
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ψ ≤ gR.
If we are in a region where the non-shirking constraint binds, the equilibrium
rent is determined by R∗ = ψ/g. A fall in y then has no impact on R∗, and
we get complete rent rigidity.
It is our belief that developing search models with a richer structure than
the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model may add new insights,
both within macroeconomics and diﬀerent subfields of labor economics. In
previous studies, inclusion of human capital in search models have improved
our understanding of human capital formation. The present paper addresses
questions relevant for both macroeconomic fluctuation and personnel eco-
nomics within a search framework. Adding more structure to search models
may therefore be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Appendix
Appendix 1: Equation (15)
Taking the derivative of (14) with respect to R gives and utilizing that
V 0(R) = 0 in equilibrium gives
q0(p)p0(R)(SF −R)− q = 0 (26)
or, by simple manipulation,
elpq(p)elRq(R) =
R
SF (R)−R. (27)
From (7) it follows that elRp(R) = −1. We want to show that elpq(p) = − η1−η .
To see this, let p = ep(θ) and q = eq(θ). Then
elpq(p) = elpeq(ep−1(p))
=
elθeq(θ)
elθep(θ) .
Since elθeq(θ) = −η and elθep(θ) = elθ[θeq(θ)] = 1− η, it follows that elpq(p) =
− η
1−η . The result thus follows.
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Appendix 2: Proof of equation (16)
A worker of type ε that reports type eε receives a utility flow given by
eω(ε,eε) = w(eε)− ψ(e(eε)− ε− eε
γ
).
Truth-telling requires that ε = argmaxhε eω(ε,eε). Since ω(ε) = argmaxhε eω(ε,eε)
it follows from the envelope theorem that
ω0(ε) =
∂eω(ε,eε)
∂ε
¯¯¯¯
h= ,
(since ∂hω(ε,hε)∂hε
¯¯¯
h= = 0). Hence
ω0(ε) = ψ0(e(ε))/γ.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 1
The associated Hamiltonian is
H = [y + ε+ γe(ε)− ψ(e(ε))− (r + s)U − (r + s)V ]h(ε)
−λψ0(e(ε))/γ − α[
Z ε
εc
(ω(ε)− (r + s)U)dH − (r + s)R].
The first order conditions for e(ε) can be expressed
(γ − ψ0(e(ε))h(ε) = λψ00(e(ε))/γ.
Furthermore,
λ0(ε) = −δH/δω = −αh(ε).
Since ε is free it follows that λ(ε) = 0. Thus, λ = α(1−H(ε)). Inserted, this
gives
γ − ψ0(e(ε)) = α1−H(ε)
h(ε)
ψ00(e(ε))/γ.
The optimal cut-oﬀ value εc is obtained by setting H = 0 and inserting that
ω(εc) = (r + s)U :
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−[y+εc+γe(εc)−ψ(e(εc))−(r+s)U−(r+s)V ]h(εc)+α(1−H(εc))
ψ0(e(εc))
γ
= 0.
Appendix 4: Unique cut-oﬀ level
Define
Ψ(εc) = y+ εc+ γe(εc)−ψ(e(εc))− (r+ s)U −α
1−H(εc)
h(εc)
ψ0(e(εc))/γ (28)
Equation (28) determines a unique εc iﬀ Ψ(εc) = 0 is uniquely defined.
dΨ(εc)
dεc
= 1+γ
de
dεc
−ψ0(e(εc))
de
dεc
−αψ
0(e(εc))
γ
d1−H(εc)h(εc)
dεc
−α1−H(εc)
h(εc)
ψ00(e(εc))
γ
de
dεc
Inserting −α1−H(εc)h(εc) ψ
00(e(εc))/γ = ψ0(e(εc))−γ (equation 19) and using that
h has an increasing hazard rate yields:
dΨ(εc)
dεc
= 1− αψ
0(e(εc))
γ
d1−H(εc)h(εc)
dεc
> 0.
Hence, Ψ(εc) = 0 is uniquely defined.
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 2
We first show the following property
Property P1: The cut-oﬀ level εc is increasing in α (for a given U).
Proof. It is convenient to rewrite the cut-oﬀ equation (20) as
y + εc − (r + s)U − (r + s)V = α
1−H(εc)
h(εc)
ψ0(e(εc))
γ
− (γe(εc)− ψ(e(εc))).
Denote the left-hand side by XL(εc) and the right-hand side by XR(εc;α).
Note that XL reflects the costs while XR reflects the gains from increasing
εc. Obviously X 0L(εc) = 1. As the second order condition must be satisfied
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locally, XL(ε) crosses XR(ε;α) from below. It is therefore suﬃcient to show
that around ε = εc an increase in α shifts XR(ε;α) up.
∂XR(εc;α)
∂α
=
1−H(εc)
h(εc)
ψ0(e(εc))
γ
+ α
1−H(εc)
h(εc)
ψ00(e(εc))
γ
de
dα
−(γ − ψ0(e(εc)))
de
dα
.
From equation (19) we have that γ − ψ0(e) = α1−Hh
ψ00
γ . Hence the two last
terms cancel out, and
∂XR(εc;α)
∂α
=
1−H(εc)
h(εc)
ψ0(e(εc))
γ
> 0,
completing the proof of Property P1.
Proof of proposition 2b). Since the rent-constraint by definition is bind-
ing, it follows directly that SM(R,U) increases in R. To show that SM(R,U)
is concave in R it is suﬃcient to show that α is decreasing in R. Consider an
increase in R and suppose to the contrary that α increases. From Property
P1 we know that εc is increasing in α. From (19) and the assumptions on ψ it
follows that e(ε) is decreasing in α for all ε. From (17) it follows that the rent
for each type is decreasing, and thus that the expected rent is decreasing, a
contradiction.
Proof of proposition 2a) From the proof of 2b) it follows that α increases
inR, hence that e(ε) is strictly increasing in ε follows directly from (19) (since
by assumption ψ0(e) is increasing and convex in e). That εc is decreasing in
R follows directly from Property P1 and that α is decreasing in R.
Proof of proposition 2c) The results in part c) follows directly from the
fact that when εc = ε, U only influences the maximization problem through
the participation constraint ω(ε) = (r + s)U . The first order condition for
optimal eﬀort as well as α is independent of U .
Appendix 6: Proof of Lemma 2
We want to show that the optimal time-independent contract is optimal
within the larger class of time-dependent contracts as well. A similar proof,
based on Baron and Besanko (1984) can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991, p. 299). To simplify the proof and avoid uninteresting technicalities
we assume that time is discrete. We consider first the case where the cut-oﬀ
level is ε. This will be modified at the end.
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The revelation principle still holds. Hence, it is suﬃcient to study the set
of contracts that map the worker’s (reported) type into a sequence of wages
and eﬀort levels {wt(ε), et(ε)}∞t=0, where t denotes the tenure of the worker
in question.
Let πt(ε, et) = y + ε+ γet(ε)− wt(ε). The expected discounted profit to
the firm is given by
Π = EεΣ∞t=0πt(ε, et)δ
t
where δ = 1−s
1+r is the discount factor, including the exit rate of the worker.
The expected discounted utility of a worker of type ε who announce type eε
is given by
W (ε,eε) = Σ∞t=0 [wt(eε)− ψ(ε, e(eε))] δt,
where
ψ(ε, e(eε)) ≡ ψ(e(eε)− ε− eε
γ
).
Incentive compatibility requires that ε = argmaxhεW (ε,eε). Let W (ε) ≡
W (ε, ε).
The optimal dynamic contract solves
max
{wt(ε),et(ε)}∞t=0
EεΣ∞t=0πt(ε, et)δ
t
subject to
• Incentive compatibility: ε = argmaxhεW (ε,eε)
• Individual rationality:W (ε) ≥ U for all ε. This constraint only binds
for ε.
Note that the participation constraint regards the expected discounted
utility of all future periods. It does not require that the utility flow of em-
ployed workers is higher than the utility flow of unemployed workers in all
periods. Thus, deferred compensation with increasing wage-tenure profile is
allowed for.
Let Cd = {wdt (ε), edt (ε)}∞t=0 denote an optimal contract within the larger
set of time-dependent contracts, and let C∗ = {w∗(ε), e∗(ε)}∞t=0 denote the
time-independent contract. We want to show that Cd is equivalent to C∗, in
the sense that it implements the same eﬀort level in each period, the same
discounted expected profit to the firm, and the same expected discounted
rents to the workers.
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Suppose Cd 6= C∗. Then Cd cannot implement a time independent eﬀort
level, as this contract by definition is dominated by the optimal static con-
tract C∗. Suppose therefore that Cd does not implement a time independent
eﬀort level. We will show that this leads to a contradiction.
To this end, consider the random time-independent stochastic mecha-
nism CdS, defined as follows: each period, the contract (wdt (ε), edt (ε)) is im-
plemented with probability δ
t
1−δ . By definition, this contract is both incen-
tive compatible and satisfies the individual rationality constraint. Further-
more, it yields a higher expected profit to the firm than the static contract
(w∗(ε), e∗(ε)), since Cd dominates C∗, and thus contradicts the optimallity
of the latter mechanism in the class of time-independent contracts. It thus
follows that Cd = C∗.
Finally, the same argument holds for any given cut-oﬀ value εc, and hence
the optimal cut-oﬀ level with time-dependent contracts must be equal to the
optimal cut-oﬀ level with time-independent contracts.
Appendix 7: Equation (23)
Taking the first order condition for the problem of maximizing V defined
by (22) gives
q0(p)p0(R)(SM(R;U)−R)− q(1− SMR ) = 0
or, by simple manipulation,
elpq(p)elRq(R) = (1− SMR )
R
SM −R,
analogous to (27). By taking exactly the same steps as in Appendix 1 (23)
follows.
Appendix 8
Let eε be a stochastic variable with finite support, and define the stochastic
matching term as ε = keε. We will show that there exists an interval (k, k)
such that for any k in this interval the following holds: 1) R > RF , and 2)
the cut-oﬀ level is equal to ε.
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For suﬃciently small values of k we have that R < RF and first best
eﬀort and hiring is feasible with εc = ε. Define k as the value of k such
that R = RF . As workers have full incentives, w0(y) = 1. Since firms have
positive profit it thus follows that y(ε) > w(ε), otherwise firms would obtain
zero profits. Thus, increasing the cut-oﬀ level has a first-order eﬀect on
expected surplus. Reducing the incentive power of the contract slightly only
gives a second-order eﬀect on expected surplus. Thus, for values of k on an
interval above k firms reduce the incentive power of the contract below first
best and still hire all types.
Appendix 9: Proof of Lemma 5
Diﬀerentiating (24) gives (recall that by the very definition of neutral
shifts we know that the functional form of SR(R) does not change)
−S∗RRR∗dR∗ + (1− S∗R)dR∗ =
β
1− β (dS
∗ − dR∗)
or
dS∗ = [1− 1− β
β
S∗RRR
∗ +
1− β
β
(1− S∗R)]dR∗
Since the coeﬃcient before dR∗ is strictly positive dR∗ and dS∗ have the
same sign. Rearranging (24) gives
J∗ ≡ S∗ −R∗
=
1− β
β
R∗(1− S∗R)
Diﬀerentiating gives
dJ∗ =
1− β
β
(1− S∗R − S∗RRR∗)dR∗
Since the coeﬃcient before dR∗ is strictly positive dJ∗ and dR∗ have the same
sign.
Appendix 10: Proof that S∗ increases in y and A and decreases in
z and c.
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i) Shifts in y.
Consider a positive shift in y. From lemma 3 we know that in equilibrium,
U∗ is maximized, hence it is trivial to show that U∗ is increasing in y.
Suppose that S∗ shifts down following an increase in y.. From Lemma 5 it
follows that R∗ and J∗ = S∗ −R shifts down. The free entry condition then
implies that p falls. But then from (5) we have that U∗ falls, a contradiction.
ii) Shifts in z, A and c.
Consider again the equilibrium condition (24). Shifts in z, A and c only
influences the modified Hosios condition through their eﬀects on the equilib-
rium value of U∗. Define L(R;U∗) as the left-hand side of (24), so that the
equilibrium condition can be written
L(R;U∗) ≡ (1− SMR (R))
R
SM(R,U∗)−R
=
β
1− β
The function L is increasing in R for a given value of U∗. As SM is decreasing
in U∗, and SMRU = 0 it follows that L shifts up when U∗ increases. Hence R∗
is decreasing in U∗, as is S∗. From Lemma 3 we know that in equilibrium,
U∗ is maximized, hence it is trivial to show that U∗ is increasing in z and A
and decreasing in c. The claims thus follows.
Appendix 11:
Here we show that an increase in k increases SMR (i.e., increases α) if
b ≥ 1/2 is above 1/2. In the proof of proposition (2) part b, see appendix
5, we showed that α is decreasing in R. It is thus suﬃcient to show that
for a given α, an increase in γ implies that the rent-constraint defined in
equation (18) is no longer satisfied as the associated R increases. Taking
the expectation of equation (17) and using that eR(εc) = 0 it follows that
expected rent can be expressed
(r + s)R =
Z k
−k
Z ε
−k
ψ0(e(ε))
γ
dεdH(ε)
=
Z k
−k
Z ε
−k
b(e(ε))dεdH(ε) (29)
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Using integration by parts gives
(r + s)R = −|k−k(1−H)
Z ε
−k
b(ε)d+
Z k
−k
b(ε)(1−H)dε
=
Z k
−k
b(ε)(1−H)dε. (30)
Now ε = μk, H(ε) = eH(ε/k), h(ε) = eh(ε/k)/k. Hence (30) can be written as
(r + s)R =
Z 1
−1
kb(kμ)(1− eH(μ))dμ (31)
From equation (21) we have that
b(kμ) = 1− αk1−
eH(μ)eh(μ) ψ
00(e(kμ))
γ2
. (32)
Now that b(kμ) is decreasing in k. Suppose not. Then e(kμ) increases, and
hence also ψ00(e(kμ)), in which case the right-hand side of (32) decreases, and
we have derived a contradiction.
Inserted into (31) the expression for R can be rewritten as
(r + s)R =
Z 1
−1
k[1− αk1−
eH(μ)eh(μ) ψ
00(e(kμ))
γ2
](1− eH(μ))dμ.
Taking the derivative with respect to k gives
d(r + s)R
dk
=
Z 1
−1
[1− 2αk1−
eH(μ)eh(μ) ψ
00(e(kμ))
γ2
− k2α1−
eH(μ)eh(μ) ψ
000(e(kμ))
γ2
de(kμ)
dk
](1− eH(μ))dμ
>
Z 1
−1
[1− 2αk1−
eH(μ)eh(μ) ψ
00(e(kμ))
γ2
](1− eH(μ))dμ
=
Z 1
−1
[2b(kμ)− 1](1− eH(μ))dμ.
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To get the result we have used that de(kμ)dk < 0 (since b(kμ) is decreasing in k)
and that ψ000 is positive and inserted from equation (32). Hence, a suﬃcient
condition ensuring that an increase in k increases R for a given α is b ≥ 1/2.
Appendix 12: Proof of Proposition 5.
First we show that dhy(k)dk = 0. Write ey(k) as
ey(k) = Z 1
−1
[y + kμ+ γe∗(kμ, k)− ψ(e∗(kμ, k))]d eH(μ),
where e∗(kμ, k) denotes the eﬀort level prescribed by the optimal contract as
a function of μ and k. At k = k, e∗ maximizes ey(k), and due to the envelope
theorem it follows that we can ignore the eﬀects of a change in k on e∗. Thus,
dey(k)
dk
=
Z 1
−1
μd eH(μ) = 0.
The next step is to show that the equilibrium responses of U and S to a
change in k at k = k is zero. Taking the derivative of (8) for a given U∗,
using that J − V = S −R and using the envelope theorem gives
r
dV
dk
= q(R∗)
∂SM(R, μ, k)
∂k
= 0,
since (r+s)SM(R, μ, k) = ey(k)−(r+s)U and dhy(k)dk = 0. Hence V max(U) does
not change, and from the equilibrium equation (9) we have that U∗0(k) = 0.
Finally, we can write S∗(k) = SM(R∗, U∗, k), and since SMR = 0 at R = R it
follows that S∗0(k) = 0.
Then we turn to R∗, which we write as R∗ = R∗(k). At k = k, the
derivative of R∗(k) may not exist. Define R∗0(k) = limk→k+ R
∗0(k). We want
to show that R∗0(k) > 0. Since S∗ is constant we know from equation (24)
that R∗(k) is increasing in k at k = k if and only if SMRk > 0, at this point,
i.e., if dα(k)dk ≡ limk→k+ α(k) > 0. Taking the expectation of equation (17) it
follows that expected rent can be written as (since eR(ε) = 0).
(r + s)R =
Z k
−k
Z ε
−k
ψ0(e(ε))/γdεdH(ε)
=
Z k
−k
Z ε
−k
b(e(ε))dεdH(ε) (33)
34
(since γb = ψ0). Suppose now, contrafactually, that b(ε) = bˆ for all ε, where
bˆ is a constant in (0, 1]. Then
R =
Z k
−k
Z ε
−k
bˆdεdH(ε)
= bˆk.
At k = k, we know that b = 1 for all ε, and thus that R∗ = R = k.
Taking the derivative with respect to k, still assuming bˆ constant over types
gives
bˆ0(k)|k=k = −
1
k
< 0.
For k < k we know that b is not constant in ε. However, it follows that
db(ε)
dk |k=k ≥ bˆ0(k)|k=k for some ε. Furthermore, since b(ε) is increasing in ε
for all k < k it follows that db(ε)dk |k=k is largest at ε = ε, hence db(ε)dk |k=k < 0.
From equation (21) we know that dαdk |k=k > 0. It follows that R∗0(k) > 0 and
hence also that limk→k+
du
dk > 0. The result thus follows.
Appendix 13: Proof of Lemma 6
Consider the first order conditions for the optimal contract defined in
Proposition 1. We want to show that an increase in γ increases the Lagrange
parameter α. This is equivalent to showing that for a given α, an increase
in γ implies that the rent-constraint defined in equation (18) is no longer
satisfied, as R has increased. From equation (33) it then follows that it is
suﬃcient to show that a positive shift in γ increases b(ε) for all ε for a given
value of α.
The first order condition for eﬀort (19) reads
γ[1− ψ0(e(ε))/γ − α1−H(ε)
h(ε)
ψ00(e(ε))/γ2] = 0.
It is suﬃcient to show that an increase in γ, keeping b(ε) = ψ0(e(ε))/γ
constant, increases the LHS of this equation. The second order conditions
then ensure that ψ0(e(ε))/γ increases. Substituting in b(ε) = ψ0(e(ε))/γ gives
γ[1− b(ε)− α1−H(ε)
h(ε)
ψ00(e(ε))b(ε)2
ψ0(e(ε))2
] = 0.
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For a given b, e is increasing in γ, and it follows that the left-hand side is
increasing in e provided that ψ
00(e(ε))
ψ0(e(ε))2 is decreasing.
Appendix 14: Proof of Proposition 6
Consider proposition (6). It is convenient to repeat the cut-oﬀ equation
(20)
−[y+ εc+γe(εc)−ψ(e(εc))− (r+ s)U∗] +α
(1−H(εc))
h(εc)
ψ0(e(εc))
γ
= 0. (34)
Denote the left-hand side by XL(εc), with all the variables (less εc) taking
their equilibrium values. Note that XL(εc) denotes the marginal gain from
increasing εc. As the second order condition must be satisfied locally, we
know that ∂XL/∂ε < 0 around ε = εc.
Consider first a shift in y. We want to show that εc decreases in y.
Suppose first that α is constant, independent of y. Then eﬀort is independent
of y as well. Hence, the derivative of (34) reads
∂XL(εc)
∂y
= −1 + (r + s)dU
∗
dy
.
From Appendix 10 it follows that (r+ s)dU
∗
dy < 1. It thus have that XL shifts
down and hence that εc is decreasing in y.
Suppose then that dαdy < 0. From Property P1 in Appendix 5 we know
that εc defined by (34) is increasing in α (even when the eﬀects of an increase
in α on e is taken into account). Thus εc falls even more than when α is
constant.
Suppose then finally that dαdy > 0 (this we cannot rule out). We want to
show that εc is still decreasing in y. Suppose not. From equation (21) we
have that b(ε) and thus eﬀort is decreasing in α for all worker types. Using
equation (17) the expected rents can be written as
(r + s)R =
Z ε
εc
Z ε
εc
ψ0(e(ε))
γ
dεdH (35)
Thus R∗ must fall if both α and εc increases.
Consider then the modified Hosios-condition, which we can write as
(1− α) R
∗
S∗ −R∗ =
β
1− β
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Suppose first that S∗ increases in y (as it does for a constant cut-oﬀ). Then
if α increases R∗ must increase in y as well. But then we have derived a
contradiction. Suppose then that S∗ decreases in y ( εc increases suﬃciently
much). Since α by assumption increases, the firms’ share of S∗ falls, hence
J∗ falls. But then p∗ falls as well, and then surely also (r+ s)U∗ = z+ pR∗..
However, as U∗ is maximized in equilibrium this is a contradiction.
To show the results for z and c we proceed in exactly the same way, and
it is therefore suﬃcient to study the eﬀects of changes keeping α constant.
Taking the derivative of XL with respect to z then gives
∂XL(εc)
∂z
= (r + s)
dU∗
dz
> 0.
Hence, εc is increasing in z. The argument if dαdz 6= 0 proceeds in exactly the
same way as for changes in y.
Consider changes in c. Taking the derivative with respect to c for a given
α gives
∂XL(εc)
∂c
= (r + s)
dU∗
dc
< 0.
Hence εc is decreasing in c. The argument if dαdc 6= 0 proceeds in exactly the
same way as for changes in y.
Finally, taking derivative with respect to A for a given α gives
∂XL(εc)
∂A
= (r + s)
dU∗
dA
> 0.
Hence εc is increases in A. The argument if dαdA 6= 0 proceeds in exactly the
same way as for changes in y.
Appendix 15: Proof of Lemma 7
a) Note that H(ε) = eH(ε/k) = eH(μ) and that h(ε) = eh(μ)/k. Inserting
this into (34) gives
−[y+kμc+γe(kμc)−ψ(e(kμc))−(r+s)U∗]+αk
(1− eH(μc))eh(μc) ψ
0(e(kμc))
γ
= 0.
(36)
We proceed in the same way as in Appendix 14. We first want to show
that the LHS of (36) increases in k for a given α. Denote the first term by
FT .
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∂FT
∂k
= −
µ
μc + (γ − ψ0(e))
∂e(kμc)
∂k
¶
From Appendix 12 we know that b(kμc) decreases in k and hence that e(kμc)
decreases in k. Since γ−ψ0(e) > 0, the first term is increasing in k provided
that μc ≤ 0.
Denote the second term in the equation by ST .
ST = αk
(1− eH(μc))eh(μc) ψ
0(e(kμc))
γ
= αk
(1− eH(μc))eh(μc) b(kμc)
= αk
(1− eH(μc))eh(μc) [1− αk (1−
eH(μc))eh(μc) ψ
00(e(kμc))
γ2
]
= a1k[1− a2k].
where a1 = α
(1− hH(μc))
hh(μc)
and a2 =
(1− hH(μc))
hh(μc)
ψ00(e(kμc))
γ2 . Now
∂ST
∂k
= a1[1− 2ka2]− a1k2
∂a2
dk
.
Since e(kμ) is decreasing in k we know that ψ00(e(kμc)) is decreasing in k,
and hence that ∂a2dk < 0. A suﬃcient condition for ST being increasing in k
is thus that 1− 2a2k > 0, or a2k < 1/2. Since b(kμc) = 1− a2k this holds if
and only if b(kμc) > 1/2, which is true by assumption.
Suppose then that the equilibrium value of α increases. Then we know
from Property P1 in Appendix 5 that this will increase εc even further.
Suppose then that α decreases. We want to show that this is incompatible
with a decrease in εc. To this end suppose both εc and α decreases. From
equation (21) it follows that b(ε) and thus eﬀort is decreasing in α for all
worker types. Using equation (17) the expected rents can be written as
(r + s)R =
Z ε
εc
Z ε
εc
ψ0(e(ε))
γ
dεdH. (37)
It follows that R increases. Consider then the modified Hosios-condition,
which we can write as
(1− α) R
∗
S∗ −R∗ =
β
1− β .
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An increase in R and a decrease in α is only consistent with the modified
Hosios condition if S∗ increases, in which case U∗ surely increases (both R∗
and the job finding rate increases). However, we already know that U∗(k)
is strictly decreasing in k whenever εc = ε. Since the equilibrium value U∗
maximizes U it follows from the envelope theorem that U is decreasing in k
whenever εc is suﬃciently close to ε, and we have derived a contradiction.
Result b) We use the same method as above. Consider equation (34).
For a given α we know from Appendix 12 and Lemma 6 that an increase in
γ leads to an increase in b(ε) for a given α, hence the second term of (34)
and thus also εc increases. If α increase we know from Property P1 that this
increases εc even further. Hence we have only left to show that εc increases
even if α falls.
Suppose therefore that α and εc fall. Then b(ε) surely increases, From
equation (37) it follows that R∗ increases.
Consider then the modified Hosios-condition:
(1− α) R
∗
S∗ −R∗ =
β
1− β .
If α falls and R∗ increases, then surely J and the job finding rate increases
as well. Hence the equilibrium value of U increases. However, by assumption
U∗ is constant, and we have derived a contradiction.
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